**Mali**

**Country**

Mali

**Time Period**

A peace accord was reached in June 20, 2015. This accord, brokered by Algeria, was signed by the rebel group Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) and loyalist fighters.[[1]](#footnote-0)

* Date of coup
* Date of elections
* Current difficulties

**Insurgency Description**

Summarize the group that was intended to be reintegrated - e.g. name, size, location, religious influences, influential texts, speeches

-**4000 specified by WB**

**Civilian Agency Involvement**

Which local, state, and federal agencies were involved in the model? How did social services, healthcare services, police, etc. participate?

* **WB mentions social counseling and civilian group involvement, but no specific numbers**

**Military Involvement**

What was the role of the military in implementing the model?

* Signing of the peace deal

**International Agency/Expert Involvement**

How - if at all - did your model, consciously or not, build upon previous models? How did they solicit the input of other governments, the academic community, and/or the UN?

-Involvement of MINUSMA

-France has had particular interest and involvement in Mali’s conflicts. Will they be more invovled in DDR?

**NGO Involvement**

How - if at all - did your model leverage assistance from NGOs?

-Undetermined at this point

**Impetus for Reintegration**

What motivated the creation of a reintegration program? Surrendering soldiers, international pressure, conflict resolution, etc..

* Signing of the Accord pour la paix. Semi-autonomous North Mali, allowing for ex-fighters to be integrated into military or civilian life

**Criteria for Reintegration**

How were insurgents determined to be eligible (or ineligible) for reintegration? Did they have to give up their arms voluntarily (as opposed to being captured by force)? Were people who committed certain types of acts or crimes excluded from reconciliation programs?

* Accords specify only those who have not previously gained access to reintegration benefits (join, desert, join again or in past rebellians). Scholars warn of lack of vetting for human rights violations on both sides of conflict.
* Bursement given to spouses of ex-combattants
  + Specified in WB report

**Prosecution/Punitive Component**

Were insurgents granted any sort of amnesty - i.e. any sort of protection from prosecution conditional on completing the program? Was there any transitional justice component? To what extent did your model incorporate punishment as part of the reconciliation program?

* See Ch. 14 in Accords
* mise en place de mécanismes de justice transitionnelle notamment par l’opérationnalisation de la Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation (CVJR) ;
* création d’une Commission d’enquête internationale chargée de faire la lumière sur tous les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l’Humanité, les crimes de génocide, les crimes sexuels et les autres violations graves du Droit international, des Droits de l’homme et du Droit international humanitaire sur tout le territoire malien ;
* non amnistie pour les auteurs des crimes de guerre et crimes contre l’Humanité et violations graves des Droits de l’homme, y compris des violences sur les femmes, les filles et les enfants, liés au conflit
* Looks like amnesty except for HRV

**Community Engagement**

Were community attitudes assessed, engaged, families involved, and more?

* See “DDR and SSR Challenges in Mali”
* WB report mentions desire to, but no specifics

**Reconciliation, Social & Political Elements**

Were there efforts to reconcile combatants with their victims or communities? What aspects were included for social reintegration?

* No, as currently outlined

**Incentives**

Were there incentives for participation? If so, what were the incentives and how did they affect participation and/or reintegration?

* See WB report for packages given to spouses of ex-combatants

**Follow-up**

Does the program have mechanisms for monitoring following reintegration? How is failed reintegration dealt with?

**Cost Estimate**

How much did the program cost - rough estimate in inflation-adjusted US$ per year, if possible

Currently, the World Bank has earmarked 15 million USD for reintegration programs in Mali.

**Financing**

How did the country in question pay for the reintegration program? Government funds exclusively - or did they seek financing from the international community or NGOs?

**Results/Metrics**

Did the gov’t or any independent researchers publish statistics or data on the consequences/impact of the project?

**Lessons Learned**

Did it work? How could we learn from such models?

One of the most important lessons to be learned from Mali is the consequences of delay and vague plans. While Mali successfully negotiated a peace deal, the government is slow to enact DDR resolutions, specifically in regards to reintegration. Almost a year later after the signing of the peace accord, some combatants remain armed. Public opinion and confidence in the government’s ability to bring peace and stability is quickly deteriorating, especially as some see DDR applied in ways that seem to enrich a select few (CITATION).

Scholars and policy analysts argue that clear DDR frameworks must be established before the enactment of peace deals. This way, governments, combattants, and the civilian population have a clear consensus of the next steps to be taken.

**Bibliography**

Make sure to include the sources you researched as part of your report!

1. AllAfrica [↑](#footnote-ref-0)